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We consider an eﬃciency-wage model with the Calvo-type sticky prices and analyze op-
timal monetary policy when unemployment insurance is not perfect. With imperfect risk
sharing, strict zero-inﬂation policy is no longer optimal even if the zero-inﬂation steady-state
equilibrium is assumed to be (conditionally) eﬃcient. Quantitative result depends on how id-
iosyncratic earning losses, measured by the (inverse of the) relative income of the unemployed
to the employed, vary over business cycles. If idiosyncratic income losses are acyclical, optimal
policy diﬀers very little from the zero-inﬂation policy. However, if they vary countercyclically,
as evidence suggests, the deviation of optimal policy from complete price stabilization becomes
quantitatively signiﬁcant. Furthermore, optimal policy in such a case involves stabilization of
output to a much larger extent.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing literature on optimal monetary policy based on stochastic dynamic general
equilibrium framework with imperfect competition and staggered price-setting. Its simplest version
has two types of distortions: relative-price distortions due to staggered price-setting and distortions
associated with imperfect competition (market power). As discussed by Goodfriend and King
(1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003), if ﬁscal policy is used to oﬀset the
distortions caused by market power, then optimal monetary policy is characterized as complete
stabilization of the price level. Intuition is very simple: without distortions due to market power,
the ﬂexible-price equilibrium becomes eﬃcient, which, in turn, can be attained by zero-inﬂation
policy.1 It is the price level that has to be stabilized, but not the level of output.2 As long as the
inﬂation rate is kept at zero, any ﬂuctuations in output would be eﬃcient.
The basic model has been extended in several directions. For instance, Benigno and Woodford
(2003, 2005) and Khan, King and Wolman (2003) consider the case where distortions due to market
power are present, and illustrate that the complete price stabilization is not optimal in general.
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2005) extend the analysis further, by studying a even richer model, based
on Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). The existing research on this literature, however,
has restricted attention to complete-markets (representative-agent) models. In this paper we are
interested to see the extent to which the nature of optimal monetary policy is aﬀected by the
presence of unemployment when unemployment insurance is not perfect. In particular, we’d like
to examine whether or not the existence of the imperfectly insured unemployed calls for more
output stabilization.
For this purpose, we bring unemployment into the basic sticky-price model, building on the
eﬃciency-wage model of Alexopoulos (2004). The model has a representative household with a
continuum of individual members. In each period, each member is either employed or unemployed.
An employed worker may or may not shirk. A detected shirker will be punished by an exogenous
reduction in the wage payment.3 Firms determine the wage rate so that no workers would shirk in
equilibrium. It is assumed that all the savings-related decisions are made by the household rather
than by individual members, so that, even though the level of consumption diﬀers between the
employed and the unemployed, we can still use the representative household framework. The rest
of the model is similar to the basic sticky-price model of Woodford (2003).
1Note that this argument assumes that initial price dispersion is nil (or “small” if we are interested in a ﬁrst-order
approximation of optimal monetary policy). See Yun (2005) on this point.
2What is stabilized is the “output gap,” which is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the actual level of output and
the eﬃcient level of output.
3A relation with the model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is discussed in Appendix.
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We analyze optimal monetary policy using the linear-quadratic approach developed by Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003), and Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005). To focus
on the eﬀect of imperfect unemployment insurance on stabilization policy, we assume that ﬁscal
policy is used to make the zero-inﬂation steady-state conditionally eﬃcient. It follows that with
perfect insurance the ﬂexible-price equilibrium would be eﬃcient so that complete price-level sta-
bilization would be the optimal policy. This is not true with imperfect insurance, so that optimal
policy would involve some ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation rate. Our qualitative analysis shows that a
government-purchase shock is a negative cost-push shock, while a productivity shock is a positive
one. That is, optimal policy should generate some deﬂation (inﬂation) when there is an exogenous
increase in government purchases (productivity).
But, quantitatively, how large is the deviation of optimal policy from the complete price sta-
bilization? The answer crucially depends on how idiosyncratic income shocks vary over business
cycles. Speciﬁcally, what matters is how the relative income of the unemployed to that of the
employed varies over business cycle. We say that idiosyncratic income losses are acyclical if the
relative income of the unemployed is constant over business cycles and countercyclical if it varies
procyclically. We begin with the case where the relative income of the unemployed is constant
over business cycles. In this case, although complete price stabilization is not exactly optimal with
imperfect insurance, optimal policy diﬀers very little from it. Thus, as long as idiosyncratic income
losses are acyclical, optimal policy essentially takes the form of complete price stabilization. This
is so even though the unemployment rate goes up in a recession.
Evidence seems to suggest, however, that idiosyncratic shocks are countercycal. In particular,
earning losses of unemployed or displaced workers are found to be countercyclical (e.g., Jacobson,
LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993). To take it into account, our second numerical exercise assumes that
the relative income of the unemployed varies procyclically over business cycles. In this case, the
deviation of optimal policy from zero-inﬂation policy becomes much larger. Furthermore, optimal
policy under countercyclical idiosyncratic income losses involves stabilization of the level of output,
much more so compared to the case where idiosyncratic income losses are acyclical. Intuition is
simple: if a bad shock to the economy worsens uninsured idiosyncratic shocks and makes the
unemployed more miserable, policy should respond to reduce the number of unemployment, which
is to increase the level of output.
Our numerical exercise suggests that the mere existence of the imperfectly insured unemployed
may not justify output stabilization, for which there need to be systematic variation of idiosyncratic
risk over business cycles. An important limitation of our model is that idiosyncratic shocks are
purely transitory. Evidence such as Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) suggests, however, that
idiosyncratic shocks are highly persistent as well as countercyclical. Based on a non-monetary
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growth model, Krebs (2005) demonstrates that the welfare cost of business cycles can be sizable
with such idiosyncratic shocks. Analyzing optimal policy with persistent idiosyncratic shocks is
left for future research.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model economy is described. In Section 3 the
eﬃcient allocation and the ﬂexible-price equilibrium are discussed. In Section 4 a linear-quadratic
approximation of the model is derived. In Section 5 optimal monetary policy is examined in the
case where the degree of risk sharing is constant over business cycles. Section 6 considers the case
where the degree of risk sharing is procyclical. Concluding remarks are in Section 7.
2 The model economy
In this section we describe our model economy. Its key features are staggered price setting and
unemployment. Our model builds on Woodford (2003) for the former and the eﬃciency-wage
model of Alexopoulos (2004) for the latter. Alexopoulos’s model diﬀers from the well known
model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) in that a detected shirker is punished by a reduction in
the wage rate, rather than by getting ﬁred. Nevertheless, as discussed in Appendix, it becomes
observationally equivalent to the Shapiro-Stiglitz model with a particular unemployment insurance
program. Indeed, we ﬁnd it very convenient that Alexopoulos’s model can be made observationally
equivalent to the standard indivisible-labor model of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), or to
the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, depending on the assumed unemployment insurance program.
2.1 Households
There is a representative household which has a continuum of individual members of unit measure.
In each period, randomly selected Nt individuals receive job oﬀers. The rest, 1 − Nt, are unem-
ployed.4 All employed workers work for a ﬁxed length of hours, h. An employed worker, however,
may or may not shirk. A shirker is a worker whose eﬀort level is diﬀerent from that required by
her employer, et.5
The utility ﬂow of an employed individual who consumes C and exerts an eﬀort level e is given
by
U(C,e)=l nC + ω ln(H−he), (1)
4We assume that whether or not each individual receives a job oﬀer is observable and that a person who turns
down the job oﬀer loses the eligibility for unemployment beneﬁts. Then as long as the unemployment-insurance fee
is not too large, no one would turn down a job oﬀer.
5As we shall see, the required level of eﬀort will be the same for all ﬁrms.
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where ω,H > 0 are constant parameters, and C is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of diﬀerentiated
consumption goods, c(i), i ∈ [0,1]:
C =








Given the prices of diﬀerentiated products, p(i), i ∈ [0,1], the standard cost-minimization argument
yields the price index, P:
P =













The utility ﬂow of an unemployed individual is given by U(C,0).
Individual members of a household do not participate in the asset market. Instead, it is the
household that trades state-contingent claims, At+1; receives (nominal) dividends from the ﬁrms,
Πt(i), i ∈ [0,1]; and pays (nominal) lump sum taxes to the government, Tt. The ﬂow budget
constraint of the household is then given by
It + Et[Qt,t+1At+1]=At +
  1
0
Πt(i)di − Tt, (2)
where It is the “income” distributed equally across the household members, and Qt,t+1 is the
stochastic discount factor used to evaluate state-contingent claims, At+1. We assume the natural










Here, Qt,t+j is the stochastic discount factor used to evaluate date-t+j nominal income at date t,
which is deﬁned recursively as
Qt,t+j = Qt,t+j−1Qt+j−1,t+j,j ≥ 1,
with Qt,t ≡ 1.
With lump-sum transfer It from the household, the date-t consumption of an employed indi-
vidual who is not detected shirking, Ce,t, is given by
PtCe,t = It + hWt − UI
f
t , (4)
where Wt is the nominal wage rate, and UI
f
t is the unemployment-insurance fee. A shirker is
caught with probability d ∈ (0,1). A detected shirker receives only a fraction s ∈ [0,1) of the
5Optimal monetary policy with imperfect unemployment insurance
wage. Both s and d are constant, exogenous parameters. The date-t consumption of a detected
shirker, Cs,t, becomes
PtCs,t = It + shWt − UI
f
t . (5)
Given this, a shirker would always choose e = 0. Finally, the level of consumption of an unemployed
is given as





t denotes unemployment beneﬁts.
The objective of the household is to maximize the average utility of its members. As we shall
see, ﬁrms set the wage rate, Wt, and the required level of eﬀort, et, so that employed workers never






NtU(Ce,t,e t)+( 1− Nt)U(Cu,t,0)
 
(7)




t,W t,Πt(i);i ∈ [0,1],t ≥ 0}, the household
chooses {It,At+1;t ≥ 0} so as to maximize the average utility (7) subject to (2), (3), (4), (6).





Nt+1UC(Ce,t+1,e t+1)+( 1− Nt+1)UC(Cu,t+1,0)
NtUC(Ce,t,e t)+( 1− Nt)UC(Cu,t,0)
Notice that the marginal rate of substitution involves the average marginal utilities. The transver-





2.2.1 No shirking condition














where φ ≥ 1, At is the economy-wide productivity shock, et is the level of eﬀort required by the
ﬁrm, nt and ns
t are the numbers of employed and of shirkers, respectively. Given this production
technology, having shirkers would never be proﬁtable for ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm oﬀers an employment
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contract, {et,W t}, to its employed. As the following argument shows, all ﬁrms oﬀer the same
contract, so that the index of ﬁrms, i, is omitted here.
Because a shirker is detected with probability d, no workers in a given ﬁrm would shirk if
U(Ce,t,e t) ≥ (1 − d)U(Ce,t,0) + dU(Cs,t,0).
Given that Ce,t and Cs,t are determined as in (4) and (5), the incentive-compatible level of eﬀort
must satisfy







shWt + It − UI
f
t






where the ﬁrm take It,U I
f
t as given.
The cost minimization problem of the ﬁrm is then given by
min
Wt,nt
Wtnt s.t. Atf(ethnt) ≥ yt, and et ≤ e(Wt). (8)










where e and 0 <χ w < 1 are constants deﬁned in Appendix. As we shall discuss below, the
equilibrium wage rate in (9) is ineﬃcient unless unemployment insurance is perfect.
2.2.2 Calvo pricing









































   (12)
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Following Calvo (1983), we assume that only a fraction (1 − α) of randomly selected ﬁrms can
reset their prices in each period. The rest of ﬁrms simply charge the same prices as in the previous
period. Thus, if ﬁrm i receives the opportunity of resetting its product price in period t, it chooses








In this model, all ﬁrms which reset prices in the same period choose the same price.6 Let p∗
t denote














where st,T is the real marginal cost in period T of those ﬁrms that reset their prices in period t,
and





The government conducts monetary and ﬁscal policy. The ﬂow budget constraint for the govern-
ment is
Tt + τPtYt + NtUI
f
t + Et[Qt,t+1At+1]=At + PtGt +( 1− Nt)UI
b
t,
where At+1 denotes the state-contingent debt issued by the government and A0 is given.





as well as Pt, Nt,a n dYt. Fiscal policy sets Tt in the “Ricardian” way (Woodford, 1995) so that
we do not need specify the details of the conduct of ﬁscal policy. Monetary policy is formulated
as in Woodford (2003, Chapter 7), Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005), among others. Thus,
optimal monetary policy is implicitly deﬁned as the solution to the (adequately modiﬁed version
of) Ramsey problem. With a linear-quadratic approximation, in particular, monetary policy is to
set a state-contingent path of inﬂation rates.
2.4 Exogenous variables
The unemployment-insurance fee, UI
f
t , is assumed to remain small enough that no worker with a
job oﬀer would turn it down. Speciﬁcally, given that U(Ce,e)=U(Cs,0) in equilibrium and that
6An implicit assumption here is that each ﬁrm possesses the same, constant amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. If we
allow for accumulation of such capital, the price chosen by a ﬁrm would depend on the amount of capital it holds.
See Woodford (2005) for such a model.
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a worker who turns down a job oﬀer is not eligible for unemployment beneﬁts, a job oﬀer would




which is assumed to hold throughout this paper.












If unemployment insurance is perfect, Bt = 1; otherwise, Bt < 1. Let Ct be the aggregate level of
consumption:
Ct ≡ NtCe,t +( 1− Nt)Cu,t.
The goods-market equilibrium condition is given by
Yt = Ct + Gt, (14)
where Gt is government purchases. The levels of consumption of the employed and the unemployed
are expressed respectively as
Ce,t =
1




Nt +( 1− Nt)Bt
Ct. (16)
The unemployment insurance program is run with balanced budget: NtUI
f
t =( 1− Nt)UI
b
t.
Note that here unemployment insurance aﬀects equilibrium only through its eﬀect on Bt.I no u r
benchmark analysis, we assume for simplicity that the unemployment beneﬁts (and fees) in each
period are determined so that this ratio remains constant:
Bt = ¯ B ∈ (0,1], for all t.
We later relax this assumption in Section 6 and let this ratio, Bt, ﬂuctuate procyclically over time.
In the benchmark case, there are two stochastic shocks: the government-purchase shock, Gt,
and the productivity shock, At. Assume that they take the form:
Gt = sG ¯ Ye ξG,t, and At = ¯ AeξA,t,
where sG ∈ (0,1), ¯ Y is the steady-state level of output, and {ξG,t, ξA,t} follows a stationary
stochastic process with unconditional mean of zero. Let ξt denote the vector of these exogenous
disturbances:
ξt =( ξG,t,ξ A,t).
When Bt is allowed to ﬂuctuate, we let Bt = ¯ BeξB,t,a n dξt =( ξG,t,ξ A,t,ξ B,t).
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3 Eﬃcient allocation and ﬂexible-price equilibrium
In this section we ﬁrst rewrite the household’s utility in terms of aggregate output and a measure
of output dispersion across ﬁrms. A key ﬁnding is that the less risk sharing is, the less concave
the household’s utility is in aggregate output. Then we consider the eﬃcient allocation given the
exogenous shocks: Gt and At. Here, eﬃciency is deﬁned conditional on that the level of eﬀort equals
the equilibrium level, e, and that unemployment insurance is limited by ¯ B. We shall also derive the
ﬂexible-price equilibrium. It provides a useful benchmark, because, to a ﬁrst-order approximation,
the level of output in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium coincides with that in a sticky-price equilibrium
with zero inﬂation.
3.1 Utility ﬂow of the household
Using (14)-(16), the ﬂow utility of the household (i.e., the average utility ﬂow of its members) is
given by


















Nt +l n ( H),




Nt +l n ( H), (17)
where
z(N;B) ≡ (1 − N)lnB − ln
 
N +( 1− N)B
 
.
The function z(N;B) represents the ineﬃciency caused by imperfect risk sharing, B.I fB =1 ,
z(N;1) = 0 for all N, so that the ﬂow utility of the household takes the same form as in the
indivisible labor model of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988):




Nt +l n ( H).
When B<1, z(N;B) has a minimum at N = N(B), where
N(B) ≡






and is increasing in N for N>N (B) and decreasing in N for N<N (B). In what follows, we
focus on the case where Nt > 1/2 holds almost surely for all t. Note also that the function z(N;B)
is convex in N. Therefore, imperfect risk sharing makes the household’s objective function less
concave.
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di ≥ 1. (19)
where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality.
Using this, the ﬂow utility of the household can be expressed as a function of Yt,Δ t,a n d
exogenous disturbances:
W(Yt,Δt;ξt)=U(Yt;Gt)+Z(Yt,Δ;At, ¯ B) − V (Yt,Δt;At)+l n ( H), (20)
where











Since N(Y,Δ;A)i sc o n v e xi nY ,s oi sZ(Y,Δ;A,B). Hence imperfect unemployment insurance,
¯ B<1, makes the objective function of the household less concave relative to the case of perfect
insurance. That is, ceteris paribus, the household tends to be willing to accept larger ﬂuctuations
in output when risk sharing is not perfect. This property plays an important role in determining
the character of optimal monetary policy in our model. Throughout this paper we assume that
Z(Y,Δ;A,B) is not so convex that W(Y,Δ;ξ) is strictly concave in Y and Δ for each ξ.
Assumption 1. For each ξ, W(Y,Δ;ξ) is strictly concave in Y and Δ.
3.2 Eﬃcient rate of output
The eﬃcient allocation is the feasible allocation that maximizes the expected discounted sum of
the household’s average utility ﬂows, {Wt}, in (20). This Pareto problem has no predetermined
variables and can be solved state by state in a static fashion. For each ξt, the eﬃcient allocation,
{y∗
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where Yt is given by (11). Under our assumption, it is straightforward to see that there is no
output dispersion in the eﬃcient allocation:
y∗
t(i)=Y ∗
t , and Δ∗
t =1 ,
and that the eﬃcient level of aggregate output satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition:
UY (Y ∗
t ;Gt)+ZY (Y ∗
t ,1;At, ¯ B)=VY (Y ∗
t ,1;At). (24)





Thus lower risk sharing (lower ¯ B) raises the eﬃcient level of output. This is because less risk
sharing makes unemployment more costly, and hence the eﬃcient level of unemployment is lower,
which implies that the eﬃcient level of output is higher.
3.3 Flexible price equilibrium
Here we consider the ﬂexible-price equilibrium, in which each ﬁrm can change its product price
freely in every period. The ﬂexible-price equilibrium deﬁnes the “natural rates” of endogenous
variables, which are denoted by superscript n.







In the symmetric equilibrium, all ﬁrms charge the same price, pt(i)=Pt, which yields
st(i)=1− Φ, ∀i ∈ [0,1]. (26)
In the ﬂexible-price equilibrium, consumption of the employed can be written as
Cn
e,t = D(Y n











Using (9), (21) and (23), condition (26) can be expressed as
χ(1 − Φ)UY (Y n
t ;Gt)D(Y n
t ;At, ¯ B)−1 = VY (Y n
t ,1;At), (27)
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The natural rate of output, Y n
t , is deﬁned implicitly in (27).
As shown in Appendix, in contrast with the case of the eﬃcient rate of output (25), the natural





This is because, other things being equal, an increase in risk sharing tends to reduce the amount
of consumption of the employed due to a rise in the unemployment-insurance fee. As shown in
equation (9), a decline in consumption of the employed, in turn, lowers the wage rate and hence
increases production.
4 Linear-quadratic approximation
We wish to characterize the optimal monetary policy using the linear-quadratic approach developed
by Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005). In that approach, the monetary
authority maximizes a quadratic approximation of the utility of the representative household sub-
ject to a log-linear approximation of the aggregate supply relation. Each approximation is taken
around the zero-inﬂation steady state.
























where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross rate of inﬂation in period t. Similarly, the evolution of the price


















Using (30), we obtain











Consider the zero-inﬂation steady state, that is, the equilibrium in which ξt =0a n dΠ t =1 ,
for all t. In what follows, the value of each variable at the zero-inﬂation steady state is denoted
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by a bar. Equation (31) implies that Δt = 1, all t. The ﬁrst-order condition (13) reduces to
st(i)=1−Φ, for all i, which implies that the level of output at the zero-inﬂation steady state, ¯ Y ,
is the solution to
χ(1 − Φ)UY (¯ Y ; ¯ G)D(¯ Y ; ¯ A, ¯ B)−1 = VY (¯ Y,1; ¯ A)
We assume that the zero-inﬂation steady-state equilibrium is (conditionally) eﬃcient.
Assumption 2. The tax rate on monopoly revenue, τ, is set so that the level of output in the
zero-inﬂation steady state is eﬃcient:
¯ Y = ¯ Y ∗
Whether or not unemployment insurance is perfect, imperfect competition would cause inef-
ﬁciency at the steady state. How such ineﬃciency aﬀects the optimal equilibrium path has been
analyzed, for instance, by Khan, King and Wolman (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2003,
2005). With Assumption 2, we can focus on the ineﬃciency that imperfect unemployment insur-
ance introduces outside the steady state.
As shown in Appendix, a log-linear approximation of ﬁrst-order condition (13) for p∗
t is given
by
πt = κxt + βEtπt+1 + ut. (32)
Here xt is the (welfare-relevant) output gap:
xt ≡ ˆ Yt − ˆ Y ∗
t ,
ut is the “cost-push shock,” deﬁned by
ut ≡ κ(ˆ Y ∗
t − ˆ Y n
t ),
and κ is the constant deﬁned by
κ ≡
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α
σ−1 − δ + φ − 1
1+( φ − 1)θ
,












(1 − ¯ B) ¯ N
¯ N +( 1− ¯ N) ¯ B
≥ 0.
Note that δ = 0 with perfect insurance. It immediately follows that imperfect insurance makes κ
smaller. In other words, the real eﬀect of a nominal shock is larger with imperfect insurance.
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Proposition 1. Imperfect insurance makes the coeﬃcient κ in the AS relation (32) smaller:
κ| ¯ B<1 <κ | ¯ B=1.



















1+( φ − 1)θ
 
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
(1 − Γ),
qy ≡ σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1.








where all derivatives are evaluated at the zero-inﬂation steady state. From (32) and (33), it follows
that the exogenous shocks relevant for the optimal policy problem are summarized into a single
composite variable, ut.
5 Optimal policy with constant risk sharing
In the traditional (Ramsey) approach, the optimal policy problem, say at date t0,i st oc h o o s ea
state-contingent path, {πt,x t}t≥t0, so as to maximize the household’s utility (33) subject to the
aggregate-supply relation (32) for t ≥ t0. As is well known, this type of optimization fails to be time
consistent: if the planner is allowed to reoptimize at a future date, it will choose a diﬀerent path
of inﬂation and output gap. Concerning this issue, Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford
(2003, 2005) have shown that the optimal policy problem can be modiﬁed into a recursive form with
an additional constraint, which is to allow the planner to make a commitment for one period. The
solution to such a constrained policy problem is called optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
Speciﬁcally, in the linear-quadratic problem here, the modiﬁed policy problem at any date t0 is to
choose a state-contingent path, {πt,x t}t≥t0, so as to maximize the household’s utility subject to
the aggregate-supply relation as well as to the commitment from the previous period of the form:
πt0 =¯ πt0.
Following Woodford (2003) and others, we shall consider the policy problem constrained in this
fashion. Note, however, that it yields the same impulse responses to exogenous disturbances as
the traditional, unconstrained policy problem (Woodford, 2003, Proposition 7.9).
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Substituting into (32), we obtain the second-order diﬀerence equation in ϕt:
βqyEtϕt+1 −
 
(1 + β)qy + κ2qπ
 




(1 + β)qy + κ2qπ
 
μ + qy =0 ,
has a solution pair, μ ∈ (0,1) and 1/(βμ) > 1. It follows that a bounded solution to (36) takes the
form of




where ϕt0−1 satisﬁes the initial condition: ϕt0−1 − ϕt0 = qπ¯ πt0.G i v e n {ϕt}, the optimal state-
contingent evolution of πt and xt are derived using (34)-(35).
Equations (34), (35) and (37) tell us how the optimal state-contingent paths of πt and xt
depend on the composite shock, ut = κ(ˆ Y ∗
t − ˆ Y n
t ). For example, consider impulse responses to
a cost-push shock in period t. To be speciﬁc, suppose that ut follows an AR(1) process given by
ut = ρuut−1 + u,t where ρu ∈ (−1,1) and  u,t is i.i.d. with zero mean. Equation (37) implies that
ϕt+j = μϕt+j−1 + φuut+j,
where φu ≡− μqπ/(1−βμρu). It follows that impulse responses at dates t+j, j =0 ,1,..., become



























φu u,t, for j =0
1
qπ
μj(1 − μ) − ρj
u(1 − ρu)
μ − ρu
φu u,t, for j ≥ 1
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To see now how ut depends on the fundamental shocks, log-linearize the ﬁrst-order conditions












φ − Γ(ζ +1 )















σ−1 − δ + φ − 1
> 0 (43)







s), for s = A,G.
5.1 Eﬀects of imperfect insurance: Theoretical results
Optimal policy involves strict price stability (zero inﬂation), if the ﬂexible price equilibrium is
optimal so that ˆ Y n
t = ˆ Y ∗
t and ut = 0. It is obviously the case when unemployment insurance is
perfect: ¯ B = 1. It is also the case when the technology shock, At, is the only shock to the economy,
sG = 0. This is due to our homothetic preferences, as is discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2005).
The following proposition summarizes.




G.( b )I fsG =0 , then c∗
A = cn
A.
In general, the ﬂexible-price equilibrium is not eﬃcient outside the steady state, Y n
t  = Y ∗
t ,i n
spite of Assumption 2. Given the ﬁrst-order conditions (24) and (27), the elasticities of UY + ZY
and UY D−1 with respect to Y are important in determining the nature of optimal monetary policy.











= σ−1 − δ ≤ σ−1
7If inequality (44) below holds, c∗
A > 0.
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With ¯ B = 1, they are both equal to σ−1 since δ = Γ = 0. Thus, imperfect insurance makes
both UY + ZY and UY D−1 less elastic with respect to Y . The former follows from the fact that
imperfect insurance makes the aggregate utility less concave. The latter follows from the fact that
an increase in Y raises Ce less than C, because it reduces unemployment (this eﬀect is reﬂected in
the term D−1). As the next proposition states, this property implies that the response of Y ∗
t and
Y n
t to an exogenous shift in Gt is larger with imperfect insurance than with perfect insurance.
Proposition 3. Assume that sG > 0. The responses of Y ∗
t and Y n
t to Gt are larger with imperfect
insurance than with perfect insurance:
c∗
G| ¯ B=1 <c ∗
G| ¯ B<1,
cn
G| ¯ B=1 <c n
G| ¯ B<1.
In other words, imperfect insurance makes the eﬃcient and natural rates of output more volatile
in response to a “demand shock.” The opposite is true for the response to a “supply shock,” At.
Proposition 4. Assume that sG > 0. The responses of Y ∗
t and Y n
t to At are smaller with imperfect
insurance than with perfect insurance:
c∗
A| ¯ B<1 <c ∗
A| ¯ B=1,
cn
A| ¯ B<1 <c n
A| ¯ B=1.
With perfect insurance, the eﬃcient (and the natural) rate of output is determined by the
equation UY = VY , where the left-hand side expresses the marginal beneﬁt of increasing Y and
the right-hand side its marginal cost. An increase in productivity, A, lowers the marginal cost but
does not aﬀect the marginal beneﬁt, and hence raises the eﬃcient rate of output. With imperfect
insurance, this eﬀect is partially oﬀset because A lowers ZY and D−1.
Whether G and A are positive or negative cost push shocks depends on the elasticities of
UY +ZY and UY D−1. The following lemma provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition that the
former is greater than the latter.
Lemma 1.
σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ >σ −1 − δ>0 (44)
if and only if σ−1 − δ>0 and
(σ−1 − δ)
 
2δ +l n (¯ B)Nφ
 
> (φ − 1)
 
−ln( ¯ B)Nφ− δ
 
Condition (44) holds if φ =1a n d ¯ B ∈ (0.21,1). Indeed, it is satisﬁed for all the numerical
exercises we have considered, and hence, we shall restrict our attention to such a case.
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Proposition 5. Assume that sG > 0, ¯ B<1 and (44) holds. Then the government-purchase
shock, G, is a negative cost-push shock and the productivity shock, A, is a positive cost-push shock:
cu
G < 0, and cu
A > 0.
The following proposition shows how imperfect insurance aﬀects the persistence parameter μ
of optimal policy.
Proposition 6. Under condition (44), imperfect insurance makes the persistence parameter μ in
(37) larger:
μ| ¯ B=1 <μ | ¯ B<1.
5.2 Eﬀects of imperfect insurance: Quantitative results
We have seen that exact price stability is not optimal if unemployment insurance is not perfect.
Here we examine quantitatively how diﬀerent optimal policy is from complete price stabilization.
Assume that the exogenous disturbances, ξA,t and ξG,t, follow the AR(1) process given by ξA,t =
ρAξA,t−1 +  A,t and ξG,t = ρGξG,t−1 +  G,t, where  A,t and  G,t are i.i.d. random variables with
mean zero. In the numerical exercise below, we set α =0 .66, β =0 .99 (the time unit is a quarter),
φ =1 .47, θ = 10, which are in accordance with the parameter values assumed in Woodford (2003,
Table 5.1). In addition we assume sG =0 .2a n d ¯ N =0 .94. Diﬀerent values are examined for ¯ B,
ρA and ρG.
Figures 1-4 plot optimal responses of πt, xt ≡ ˆ Yt − ˆ Y ∗
t ,a n dˆ Yt to the productivity and
government-purchase shocks, for diﬀerent values of ¯ B, ρA,a n dρG.8 We set the size of the initial
innovation to the two shocks as  A,0 = −2.34% and  G,0 = −13.76%, both of which reduce the
eﬃcient level of output by 2 percent, ˆ Y ∗
0 = −2%, in the case of ¯ B =1a n dρA = ρG =0 . I n
Figures 1-2, shocks are serially uncorrelated, ρA = ρG = 0, and diﬀerent degrees of risk sharing are
considered: ¯ B =0 .5,0.75,1.0. Consistent with the theoretical results above, exact price stabiliza-
tion is optimal in the case of perfect insurance ( ¯ B = 1), and the less risk sharing is (the lower ¯ B
is), the more optimal policy diﬀers from the complete price stabilization. Consistent with Propo-
sitions 3-4, less insurance makes optimal responses of output to the government-purchase shock
(the productivity shock) larger (smaller). In Figures 3-4, ¯ B =0 .75 and ρA,ρ G =0 ,0.5,0.9. As the
persistence of a shock becomes greater, the optimal responses to it involve larger ﬂuctuations in
inﬂation and the output gap. Those ﬁgures show, however, that, regardless of the values of ¯ B, ρA,
and ρG, deviations of optimal policy from the complete price stabilization is quantitatively very
small (note that the inﬂation rate is expressed in percent per year). We thus conclude that, as far
8Speciﬁcally, those ﬁgures plot E0πt − E−1πt etc. for t =0 ,1,...,8.
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as the degree of risk sharing is constant, imperfect risk sharing does not have quantitatively big
impact on optimal policy so that optimal policy is essentially characterized by price stabilization.
6 Optimal policy with countercyclical idiosyncratic shocks
We have so far focused on the case where the degree of risk sharing is constant, Bt = ¯ B. However,
evidence seems to suggest that idiosyncratic risk is countercyclical. In particular, what is relevant
for this paper is that earning losses of displaced workers are countercyclical.9 In this section we
shall see that optimal policy would involve much larger ﬂuctuations in inﬂation if idiosyncratic
earning losses are countercyclical, that is, if Bt ﬂuctuate procyclically.




















σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1
φ(1 − ¯ B) ¯ N[(1 − ¯ N)2 ¯ B − ¯ N2]




σ−1 − δ + φ − 1
(1 − ¯ N) ¯ B
¯ N +( 1− ¯ N) ¯ B
It follows from equations (25) and (28) that cn
B > 0a n dc∗
B < 0. Hence Bt is a negative cost-push
shock.
Proposition 7. The insurance shock, Bt, is a negative cost-push shock:
cu
B < 0.
Now let us examine quantitatively how countercyclical idiosyncratic earning losses aﬀects op-
timal policy. Assume the same size of the initial innovations to the productivity and government-
purchase shock as in the previous ﬁgures:  A,0 = −2.34% and  G,0 = −13.76%. Let also the steady-
state level of risk sharing is given by ¯ B =0 .75 and shocks are serially uncorrelated: ρA = ρG =0 .
Furthermore, assume that those negative shocks arrive with a temporary decline in the degree of
risk sharing. We consider three values for B0 =0 .65,0.7,0.75. It returns to the steady state level
after one period: Bt = ¯ B for t ≥ 1. Note that even the largest decline in B we consider (from
¯ B =0 .75 to B0 =0 .65) seems to be an empirically plausible value. For instance, based on various
9See, for instance, Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) and Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993).
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empirical work, Krebs (2005) assumes that the diﬀerence in the earnings losses of displaced workers
between booms and recessions is 12 percent in his numerical analysis.
Figures 5-6 plot the impulse response functions for those composite shocks. As we have al-
ready seen, with constant risk sharing, optimal policy is essentially characterized as complete
price stabilization. For instance, when Bt ≡ 0.75,  A,0 = −2.34% leads to π0 = −0.0063%.
As we know from Figure 1, even with Bt ≡ 0.5, π0 = −0.011%. However, if B0 moves to-
gether with  A,0, then optimal policy involves much larger responses of the inﬂation rate: when
B0 =0 .7= ¯ B−0.05, π0 =0 .12%; when B0 =0 .65 = ¯ B−0.1, π0 =0 .25%. Similarly, such counter-
cyclical idiosyncratic income losses imply much larger responses of the output gap, x0 = ˆ Y0 − ˆ Y ∗
0
(x0 =0 .013%,−0.25%,−0.53% for B0 = ¯ B, ¯ B − 0.05, ¯ B − 0.1, respectively). It is also noteworthy
that countercyclical idiosyncratic income shock calls for more stabilization of the actual level of
output, ˆ Yt: ˆ Y0 = −1.966%,−1.159%,−0.29% for B0 = ¯ B, ¯ B −0.05, ¯ B −0.1, respectively. Figure 6
illustrates that optimal responses to the government-purchase shock share similar characters.
We ﬁnd it interesting that the actual level of output, ˆ Yt, is stabilized quite strongly under
optimal policy when idiosyncratic earning losses are countercyclical. In the case where B0 declines
to 0.65, the optimal responses of π0 and ˆ Y0 are in similar magnitude. There are two reasons for
this. First, although negative shocks  A,0 and  G,0 tend to reduce the eﬃcient level of output, Y ∗
0 ,
the deterioration in risk sharing calls for stimulation of the economy and hence tends to raise the
eﬃcient level of output. These two forces oﬀset each other so that ˆ Y ∗
0 is close to zero and the
equilibrium level of output is stabilized under optimal policy. Second, ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation
rate and the output gap are larger with countercyclical idiosyncratic shock because u0 is larger,
which, in turn, is the result that a shock to risk sharing aﬀects the eﬃcient and natural levels of
output in the opposite directions (recall that cn
B > 0a n dc∗
B < 0).
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have considered an eﬃciency-wage model with the Calvo-type sticky prices and
examined optimal monetary policy when unemployment insurance is not perfect. In the standard
sticky-price model, the strict zero-inﬂation policy becomes optimal if the zero-inﬂation steady state
is eﬃcient. This is because relative-price distortions would be the only distortion in that case and
such distortions would vanish under the strict zero-inﬂation policy. We have seen, however, that
with imperfect unemployment insurance, the strict zero-inﬂation policy is no longer optimal even
if the zero-inﬂation steady-state equilibrium is (conditionally) eﬃcient. Quantitatively, though, if
the level of risk sharing is constant over business cycles, the diﬀerence between optimal policy and
strict zero-inﬂation policy is minimal. We have also shown, however, that if the level of risk sharing
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is procyclical, that is, if idiosyncratic shocks are countercyclical, as evidence suggests, the diﬀerence
becomes substantial. Indeed, in such a case, output must be stabilized much more compared to
the case with perfect insurance.
One important limitation of our model is that in order to keep the representative-household
framework idiosyncratic shocks are purely temporary. Evidence suggests that idiosyncratic shocks
are highly persistent as well as countercyclical.10 Krebs (2005) argues that persistence as well
as countercyclicality of idiosyncratic shocks matter a lot concerning the welfare cost of business
cycles. Incorporating persistent idiosyncratic shocks is left for future research.
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Cost minimization problem of a ﬁrm
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The ﬁrst equation implies that Cs/Ce =˜ s ∈ [s,1], where ˜ s is deﬁned as the solution to
d(χ − s)(1 − ˜ s)=ω(1 − s)˜ s(˜ s− d
ω − 1).
















Ce,t, where χ ≡
1 − ˜ s
1 − s
.
Equivalence with a version of Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) model
Consider the following version of Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) model: if a shirker gets caught she
is immediately ﬁred and receives no wages; there are two levels of eﬀort et ∈{ 0, ¯ e}.T h e r e s t i s
the same as our model in text. Then the incentive compatibility constraint becomes
U(Ce,t, ¯ e) ≥ (1 − d)U(Ce,t,0) + dU(Cu,t,0),
where Ce,t and Cu,t are as given in (4) and (6), respectively. This model and our model become
essentially identical if (i) ¯ e is at the level given by (45) and (ii) the unemployment insurance
program is given by
UI
f
t =( 1− Nt)shWt, and UI
b
t = NtshWt.
This is because this insurance program implies Cs,t = Cu,t in our original model.
Derivation of (25) and (28)





UYY + ZYY − VYY







N +( 1− N)B
+
(1 − B)(1 − N)NY
[N +( 1− N)B]2
=
(1 − B)NY
B[N +( 1− N)B]
B(1 − N)2 − N2
N +( 1− N)B
≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that N>1/2.
For (28), dlnY n
t /dln ¯ B is easier to compute:
∂ lnY n
∂ ln ¯ B
=
1
σ−1 − δ + φ − 1
(1 − N) ¯ B
N +( 1− N) ¯ B
≥ 0.
Here, note that σ−1 ≥ 1a n dφ ≥ δ.
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Derivation of the aggregate-supply relation (32)
A log-linear approximation of the ﬁrst-order condition for p∗
















The real marginal cost of ﬁrm i is written as
ˆ st(i)=( φ − 1)ˆ yt(i)+( σ−1 − δ)ˆ Yt − (σ−1 − δ + φ − 1)ˆ Y n
t
Taking the average over i ∈ [0,1], the average real marginal cost in period t is
ˆ st =( σ−1 − δ + φ − 1)(ˆ Yt − ˆ Y n
t )
Log-linearizing the demand function (10) yields





ˆ st,T =ˆ sT +( φ − 1)
 
ˆ yt,T − ˆ YT
 
=ˆ sT − (φ − 1)θˆ p∗











1+( φ − 1)θ]ˆ p∗
t − ˆ sT +
 






Solving for ˆ p∗




1+( φ − 1)θ
ˆ st + αβEtπt+1 + αβEtˆ p∗
t+1 (47)











1+( φ − 1)θ





1+( φ − 1)θ
(σ−1 − δ + φ − 1)(ˆ Yt − ˆ Y n
t )+βEtπt+1
which is equation (32) in the main text.
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Derivation of the welfare approximation (33)
Remember that the household’s ﬂow utility is given by
W(Yt,Δt;ξt)=U(Yt;Gt)+Z(Yt,Δ;At,B t) − V (Yt,Δt;At)+l n ( H),
where U, Z,a n dV are as deﬁned in (21)-(23). We follow Woodford (2003), and Benigno and
Woodford (2003, 2005) to obtain a quadratic approximation of the household welfare.
We denote by Ξ the vector of expansion parameters: Ξ = (ˆ Y,ξ,Δ
1/2
−1 ). First, U(Yt;Gt)i s
approximated as
U(Yt;Gt)=¯ U + UY ˜ Yt − UY ˜ Gt +
1
2
UYY ˜ Y 2




t + O( Ξ 
3)










UYY ¯ Y 2 ˆ Y 2
t − UYY ¯ Y ¯ GξG,tˆ Yt + t.i.p. + O( Ξ 
3)




UY ¯ Y + UYY ¯ Y 2 ˆ Y 2
t − UYY ¯ Y 2gt ˆ Yt + t.i.p. + O( Ξ 
3)





Next, note that the evolution of Δt, (31), implies that














βt ˆ Δt =
αθφ
 
1+( φ − 1)θ
 






+ t.i.p. + O( Ξ 
3) (48)








ZY ¯ Y + ZYY ¯ Y 2 ˆ Y 2









VY ¯ Y + VYY ¯ Y 2 ˆ Y 2
t − VYY ¯ Y 2qt ˆ Yt + t.i.p. + O( Ξ 
3)












Since the zero-inﬂation steady-state is conditionally eﬃcient,
UY + ZY − VY =0





UYY + ZYY − VYY
 









¯ Y 2(UYY + ZYY − VYY)(ˆ Yt − ˆ Y ∗
t )2 + t.i.p. + O( Ξ 
3)








σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1




+ t.i.p. + O( Ξ 
3)
where Γ is deﬁned by
Γ ≡
ZY ¯ Y
UY ¯ Y + ZY ¯ Y












αθ[1 + (φ − 1)θ]




σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1




+ t.i.p. + O( Ξ 
3)
which is (33) in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 3





σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1
−
σ−1sG
σ−1 + φ − 1
=
σ−1sGΓ(ζ +1− φ)
[σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1][σ−1 + φ − 1]
> 0
because









σ−1 − δ + φ − 1
−
σ−1sG
σ−1 + φ − 1
> 0
because δ>0.
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Proof of Proposition 4




φ − Γ(ζ +1 )
σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1
−
φ
σ−1 + φ − 1
= −
(σ−1 − 1)(ζ + 1)Γ
[σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1][σ−1 + φ − 1]
< 0





σ−1 − δ + φ − 1
−
φ
σ−1 + φ − 1
= −
(σ−1 − 1)δ
[σ−1 − δ + φ − 1][σ−1 + φ − 1]
< 0,
again, because σ−1 > 1.
Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 follows from
σ−1(1 − Γ) + ζΓ − (σ−1 − δ)=δ − Γ(σ−1 + ζ)
= δ −
ZY Y













2δ +l n ( B)Nφ
 




Proof of Proposition 5
That cu







σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1
−
σ−1sG
σ−1 − δ + φ − 1
< 0








φ − Γζ − Γ
σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1
−
φ − δ




(1 − Γ)δ +Γ ( φ − 1 − ζ)
 
 
σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1
  
σ−1 − δ + φ − 1
 
Remember that
ζ = φ − 1+
δ2
ZY Y
, and Γ =
ZY Y
ZY Y + σ−1.
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Thus







(σ−1 − 1)(σ−1 − δ)δ
 
σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1
  




because σ−1 > 1 because sG > 0a n dσ−1 >δbecause of (44).
Proof of Proposition 6
Deﬁne the quadratic function f(μ)b y












(σ−1 − δ + φ − 1)
qπ =
αθ[1 + θ(φ − 1)]
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
(1 − Γ)





(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α[1 + θ(φ − 1)]
(1 − Γ)(σ−1 − δ + φ − 1)2
σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1
For μ| ¯ B<1 >μ | ¯ B=1, it suﬃces to show that
(1 − Γ)(σ−1 − δ + φ − 1)2
σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1
<σ −1 + φ − 1
Under our assumption,
σ−1 − δ + φ − 1 <σ −1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1
It then follows that
(1 − Γ)(σ−1 − δ + φ − 1)2
σ−1(1 − Γ) − ζΓ+φ − 1
<σ −1 − δ + φ − 1
<σ −1 + φ − 1
29Optimal monetary policy with imperfect unemployment insurance



















Figure 1: Optimal responses to a productivity shock for diﬀerent degrees of risk sharing. In each
panel, the solid, dashed, and dash-dotted lines correspond to ¯ B =0 .5,0.75,1.0, respectively. The
inﬂation rate is expressed in percent per year. The output gap and the level of output are expressed
in percentage deviations from their respective steady-state values.





















Figure 2: Optimal responses to a government-purchase shock for diﬀerent degrees of risk sharing.
In each panel, the solid, dashed, and dash-dotted lines correspond to ¯ B =0 .5,0.75,1.0, respectively.
The inﬂation rate is expressed in percent per year. The output gap and the level of output are
expressed in percentage deviations from their respective steady-state values.
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Figure 3: Optimal responses to a productivity shock for diﬀerent auto-correlation coeﬃcients. In
each panel, the solid, dashed, and dash-dotted lines correspond to ρA =0 .9,0.5,0, respectively.
The inﬂation rate is expressed in percent per year. The output gap and the level of output are
expressed in percentage deviations from their respective steady-state values.






















Figure 4: Optimal responses to a government-purchase shock for diﬀerent auto-correlation coef-
ﬁcients. In each panel, the solid, dashed, and dash-dotted lines correspond to ρG =0 .9,0.5,0,
respectively. The inﬂation rate is expressed in percent per year. The output gap and the level of
output are expressed in percentage deviations from their respective steady-state values.
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Figure 5: Optimal responses to a productivity shock with countercyclical risk sharing. In each
panel, the solid, dashed, and dash-dotted lines correspond to B0 =0 .65,0.7,0.75, respectively.
The inﬂation rate is expressed in percent per year. The output gap and the level of output are
expressed in percentage deviations from their respective steady-state values.






















Figure 6: Optimal responses to a government-purchase shock with countercyclical risk sharing. In
each panel, the solid, dashed, and dash-dotted lines correspond to B0 =0 .65,0.7,0.75, respectively.
The inﬂation rate is expressed in percent per year. The output gap and the level of output are
expressed in percentage deviations from their respective steady-state values.
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